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Mega-event scepticism in South Korea: Lessons from the 2014 Incheon Asian Games 
 
Jung Woo Lee (University of Edinbuirgh) 
 
Introduction  
The Incheon Asian Games in 2014 is arguably the most controversial sporting event 
that South Korea has ever hosted. In terms of sporting performances, it was certainly an 
occasion through which the South Korean team was able to display its sporting prowess. Also, 
the President of the Olympic Council of Asia praised a safe and effective delivery of the 
Asian Games at the closing ceremony. When considering non-sporting issues related to this 
continental sporting festival, however, a different mood can be detected. Staging a sports 
mega-event is often closely connected to a social and economic policy of the host country or 
city (Horne, 2016). The Incheon Asian Games was no exception. Yet, unlike the organising 
committee’s claim that the Games would boost the local economy before the event, Incheon 
is now suffering from a huge deficit (Kim, 2014). Also, a number of newly built sporting 
facilities, including the new Asian Games stadium, are now on the verge of turning into white 
elephants (Choi, 2014). It appears that the major legacy of the Asian Games is a heavy 
financial burden.  
Over the last two decades, South Korea displayed a strong desire to bid for and host a 
diverse range of sports mega-events (Lee, 2015). For instance, this small peninsula country 
has staged the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup Finals, 
Formula 1 Grand Prix and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) 
World Championships, and in 2018 will host the Winter Olympic Games. It appears that 
South Korea, especially the local governments in host cities firmly believes that large scale 
events will bring positive implications. Yet, the Incheon Asian Games makes policy makers 
and the public reconsider this belief. After observing the financial burden that this sporting 
mega-event engendered, a sceptical view of hosting a sports mega-event is gradually on the 
rise. In this respect, the Incheon Asian Games marks a significant turning point—although an 
overly optimistic view has not yet completely disappeared. What this chapter does is it 
provides a critical overview of the social, economic and cultural issues concerning the 
Incheon Asian Games. Particular attention will be paid to the construction project, the 
sporting legacy programme and the cultural relations activity associated with the 17
th
 
Summer Asiad. By examining a series of unfortunate incidents, this work aims to offer an 
exemplary case of a not-so-successful sports mega-event so that these negative practices will 
not be repeated. Before investigating them, however, this chapter will briefly discuss key 
agendas and claimed legacies of hosting a sports mega-event in South Korea. 
 
Hosting sporting mega-events: Key agendas  
There is no need to highlight that a sports mega-event is not simply a sporting contest 
but an occasion with socio-political and economic implications. In South Korea, at least three 
specific rationales for hosting such an event can be identified. These include (1) sport mega-
event driven development and regeneration, (2) the improvement of its international 
reputation and (3) the demonstration of South Korean culture to the world. Referring to the 
rationales, firstly, hosting a sports mega-event offers a useful economic opportunity for the 
government of the host city to implement an urban regeneration programme (Yamawaki & 
Duarte, 2014). The host city can enhance the quality of urban environment since the 
preparation process entails the construction of amenities and physical infrastructures, such as 
upgraded or new transportation networks, communication systems, and other convenient 
facilities (Horne, In Press). More importantly, the large amount of public funds, which are not 
normally available to be spent on such major civil engineering projects if an international 
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sporting competition is not to be held in the city, are often given to the local authority to 
facilitate the redevelopment works associated with a sports mega-event (Preuss, 2015). 
Because of the effect of sports mega-event driven development, a number of South 
Korean cities intend to host a major sporting event. In fact, various types of competitions 
from the international rowing championship to the Winter Olympic Games have been 
awarded to the South Korean cities. Regarding this, one commentator notes that when a local 
government wins the rights to host a sporting event, its major interest does not lie in sporting 
contests themselves but actually in an urban regeneration project that hosting initiates (Chung, 
2014). In Korea, once its city is chosen to host a sports mega-event, the central government 
subsidises various construction works directly related to the event (Choi et al., 2013). In 
addition, as staging a major international sporting event creates useful business opportunities, 
commercial corporations also invest in associated facility development projects. The financial 
supports and investments from public and private sectors enable the local government to 
implement and eventually materialise costly urban regeneration without entirely relying on 
the local budget. Therefore, in South Korea, hosting a sports mega-event is often viewed as 
one of the most effective strategies to upgrade an urban environment. 
The second rationale, hosting a sports mega-event works as a diplomatic instrument to 
improve international reputation of the host country (see also, Henderson, Chapter 1, this 
collection). South Korea observed that by staging the Olympic Games and the Asian Games 
in the 1980s, it could display its remarkable industrial development—rapidly transitioning 
from one of the poorest to one of the fast developing economies in the world (see Koh, 2005; 
Bridges, 2008). In the twenty-first century, South Korea has strived for recognition as an 
influential power state in global politics. Concerning international relations today, it is 
important to secure both hard (i.e. economic prosperity and military power) and soft power 
(i.e. morally correct government policy and attractive cultural resources) to become a leading 
advanced nation (Nye, 2008). For South Korea, it is this soft power that needs to be 
developed in order to realise its aspiration. While hosting a sport mega-event does not 
automatically bring the soft power resources to the country, the implementation and 
management of socio-cultural programmes associated with sport mega-events can help 
accumulate this soft power capital.  
International development through sport is one of such activities that can accrue the 
nation’s soft power. Sport as a development tool is used to assist the development of 
emerging economies around the world (Levermore & Aaron, 2009; Maharaj, Chapter 3, this 
collection; Wise and Hall, Chapter 2, this collection). The United Nations (2009) recognises 
the usefulness of sport in improving social conditions in the poor developing nations, and 
international sport governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and 
FIFA along with non-governmental organisations such as the right to play actively participate 
in international development through sport initiatives (Darnell, 2012). The host cities and the 
organising committees often set an international sport development programme as a key 
component of social legacy. Such assistance initiatives can be seen as ethical and responsible 
sport policy, as the successful implementation of international development programme can 
contribute to boosting the host nation’s soft power. Because of this reason, as will be 
discussed later, mega-events awarded to South Korean cities also involve elements of sport 
and international development.  
Finally, a host country and city intends to display cultural heritage to international 
audiences. This can be seen as the nation’s cultural relations strategy which is also closely 
connected to a campaign for enhancing a nation’s soft power (Grix & Lee, 2013). As 
indicated earlier, the domain of culture, including those related to sport, becomes increasingly 
important in securing international political hegemony (Johnson & Cester, 2015). Staging an 
event with the capacity to attract global attention deems to be regarded as an effective tool for 
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promoting cultural prowess of the host nation. Both the established core nation and an 
emerging state through international promotion therefore attempts to harness the tactic of 
hosting a major global sporting competition as a means to cultivate their own cultural 
relations (Grix & Lee, 2013; Grix & Houlihan, 2014). South Korea is a country which 
actively utilises this tactic (Lee, 2016). It should be noted that while its economy is one of the 
strongest in the world, South Korea is still located in a relatively marginalised position in the 
realm of cultural politics and diplomacy (Lee, 2009). In other words, there has been the 
unbalanced development between hard and soft power in the county. Because South Korea is 
eager to change this situation and thereby improve its international standing, it is important 
for the country to adapt the way they represent, communicate and deliver their cultural 
products effectively to the wider global community. To do this, it comes as no surprise that 
South Korea is aggressively aiming to bid for and host mega-events to display their cultural 
merit alongside their economic prowess.  
 
Asian Games driven development in Incheon  
In 2007, the South Korean port city of Incheon was selected to host the 2014 Summer 
Asian Games. A brief explanation of Incheon’s geographical location in South Korea and in 
Asia will help understand this port city’s intention to host the continental sporting spectacle. 
Incheon is located 30 km west of Seoul, but because most of the economic and cultural 
capital in the country tends to be heavily concentrated in Seoul, the port city had witnessed 
the problem of comparative underdevelopment despite (or because of) close proximity to the 
capitol (Kim & Jung, 2014). Due to this unbalanced development, the port city is merely 
regarded as Seoul’s satellite that its economic and social environments were relatively 
neglected within the wider capital zone even though Incheon is the third largest city in the 
country in terms of population. Therefore, increasing the visibility of the city given its 
cultural and economic geography in South Korea has long been a major task of the local 
politicians.  
In addition, Incheon is a port city where the major trade seaport and the main gateway 
airport into the country are positioned. The fact that the city has such international 
transportation infrastructures indicates that the city has a potential to develop into a regional 
and global hub. As Sino-South Korean economic ties continue to strengthen, Incheon is 
expected to play an important role in Northeast Asian trade in the coming years because of its 
logistically important geographical location. Nevertheless, the international transportation 
infrastructure in Incheon merely offers a highway to the capital city where most business 
meetings take place. It appears that Incheon’s public facilities yet again mainly serve the 
interests of Seoul. In an attempt to attract more international capital and resources to Incheon 
to augment its capacity to become a Northeast Asian business hub, the Incheon metropolitan 
government have been recently investing in extensive urban regeneration. This includes the 
opening of a free trade zone and the installation of convenient facilities for foreign visitors in 
their wider municipal area. In spite of these efforts, the port city’s potential has not yet 
materialised.  
Incheon’s willingness to host the Asian Games must be understood in relation to its 
relative underdevelopment and its desire to develop into a Northeast Asian economic 
exchange and trade hub. A few rationales can be identified in this respect. Firstly, the 
metropolitan government of Incheon expected that the central government would allocate 
more development funds to the port city so that it can improve the condition of its urban 
environment if Incheon won the rights for hosting the Asian Games. Secondly, by staging this 
continental sporting event, the city would be able to re-establish and promote its new 
geographical identity as a multicultural business hub in Northeast Asia. Moreover, hosting 
the Asian Games was perceived to not only help facilitate the city’s urban development 
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endeavours to reclaim its underestimated potential domestically, but also disseminate its 
rebranded urban image across Asia and further afar. The project of staging the sports mega-
event was, therefore, an attractive option for the metropolitan government in achieving a 
much delayed urban regeneration initiative. 
When the metropolitan government prepared for its Asian Game bid in 2007 they 
encountered an unexpected problem. As part of a bidding campaign, it is important for the 
candidate city to show the Olympic Council of Asia a message that the central government is 
fully supportive of the bid. Then South Korean President, Roh Moo-hyun, was lukewarm 
about Incheon’s Asian Games bid. This was because of Pyeongchang simultaneous efforts in 
trying to host the Winter Olympic Games. Considering this winter sporting competition as a 
more significant national project, the central government was in favour of supporting 
Pyeongchang’s bid—worrying that undertaking two separate bidding campaigns might 
negatively affect Pyeongchang’s effort to win the Winter Olympics (Kim, 2012). In addition, 
Incheon was financially in deficit from overspending the city’s budget on urban 
redevelopment projects. Hosting a mega sporting event would require more public funding 
and the central government rightfully expected that staging the Asian Games would worsen 
Incheon’s economic circumstances.  
Despite a lack of support from the central government, Incheon carried out its 
aggressive bidding campaign and was successfully selected to host the 17
th
 Asian Games. 
The Incheon city justified the rationale for hosting this sporting event with reference to its 
own financial survey which anticipates that the Asian Games would bring economic benefits 
to the port city by promoting tourism in the destination during the sports events and attracting 
more foreign direct investment after the Games (see KIEP, 2007). Based on this survey, the 
metropolitan government believed that it could resolve the current financial deficit by 
marketing the city through the sporting event. During the preparation period, tensions aroused 
again between the municipal and central governments over the provision of public funds. No 
issue exemplifies this conflict better than building sporting facilities, particularly the 
construction of the main Asian Games Stadium.  
Initially, in 2008, Incheon proposed to build 21 new sporting facilities (including the 
main Asian Games Stadium) out of 39 sporting fields necessitated to stage the Asian Games. 
Yet, given the huge amount of money needed to construct these venues, the central 
government did not approve this Asian Games development plan. The metropolitan 
government resubmitted its Asian Games development proposal and this time only 12 of 40 
essential sporting facilities would be new constructions. This proposal still included the 
construction of the main stadium—the most expensive venue. The central government 
recommended using the underused, but still functional, World Cup stadium built for the FIFA 
World Finals in 2002 instead because it is a more sustainable option particularly considering 
the amount of taxpayers’ money used simply to maintain it. Nevertheless, in response to this, 
Incheon promised that no public funds would be spent on building this most expensive 
facility and it would seek a funder from the private sector to complete the main stadium 
construction project. This would reduce almost 40% of financial supply from the central 
government. On this condition, the South Korean government approved Incheon’s Asian 
Games development plan in 2009. 
In 2010, amidst Incheon’s serious financial deficit, Song Young-gil (the newly elected 
mayor) proclaimed that improving the city’s economic condition was his most urgent 
monetary policy. Incheon’s new mayor notified that the municipal government should 
renovate the World Cup stadium for the purpose of the Asian Games because it was simply 
unable to secure sufficient private funds to construct the new main stadium. This plan seemed 
fair and acceptable given the city’s financial difficulties. Yet, citizens and local developers 
from the west Incheon area (where the proposed construction site was to be located) protested 
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against the new mayor’s idea. West Incheon was a comparatively underdeveloped part of the 
city and people here considered the venue construction a valuable opportunity to upgrade 
their living conditions. Local politicians representing west Incheon also joined this protest. In 
the end, the new mayor, unable to persuade its citizens, dropped his idea and returned to the 
original plan.  
Given that no organisations from the private sector were willing to invest in the main 
stadium construction project, the metropolitan government again sought financial support 
from the central government—who initially refused this requested outright. In response, 
millions of Incheon citizens signed a petition for the publicly funded Asian Games Stadium 
while politicians representing Incheon city put further pressure on the government. 
Subsequently, the central government agreed that it would subsidise one-quarter of the total 
cost needed, and the rest of money would be deducted from the budget to be allocated to the 
municipal government in the years following.  
After these incidents, the municipal government managed to deliver the Asian Games 
as planned in 2014. Given the sheer cost to build the new sporting facilities, Incheon’s debts 
increased following the Asian Games. Measuring the long-term economic impact of hosting 
the Asian Games at this stage is a difficult task, but it is clear that Incheon city is suffering 
from a heavy economic burden—a significant portion of which is accumulated from the 
construction and maintenance of the sporting facilities. It seems that a large amount of 
taxpayers’ monies was wasted, given that the Asian Games main stadium (the most costly 
facility to build) is currently of very little use and on the verge of becoming a white elephant. 
It seems that claimed economic benefits and development opportunities associated with 
hosting the Asian Games are unlikely to materialise in the feasible future. 
 
The Asian Games and international sport development  
Sport has been increasingly used as a tool for international development and for 
sporting mega-events today (Levermore & Aaron, 2009), and the South Korean government 
also takes this sport for international development initiative seriously. The government set 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to be one of the nation’s major foreign policy 
agendas, with a number of sport governing bodies in South Korea actively engaged in various 
international sport development activities (Na & Dallaire, 2015). The Incheon Asian Games 
was no exception. When Incheon was elected to be a host of the 17
th
 Summer Asiad, the 
metropolitan government of Incheon claimed that this sporting occasion would make a 
valuable contribution to the development of sport in Asia. In order to achieve this goal, 
Incheon city introduced the Vision 2014 programme.  
The Vision 2014 programme refers to an international sport development campaign 
associated with the Incheon Asian Games. The Incheon metropolitan government in 
collaboration with the Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) initiated this sport assistance 
programme with the aim of supporting the development of sport in less well-off nations in 
Asia. The Vision 2014 consists of three major activities: (1) inviting young athletes from 
developing countries to training camps in Incheon, (2) dispatching qualified sports coaches to 
marginalised regions in Asia and (3) providing sport equipment for athletes in 
underdeveloped nations in the continent (Incheon Metropolitan Government, 2015). Given 
South Korea has recently emerged as an international sporting power, this sport development 
opportunity has potential to identify and foster sporting talents in peripheral countries in the 
continent. Through this, the Incheon Asian Games also potentially contributes to reducing the 
development gap between Northeast and Southeast Asia.  
The metropolitan government of Incheon undertook this international sport 
development initiative for eight years from 2007 to 2014, costing around $20 million (all 
monetary figures in US dollars). By implementing the Vision 2014, Incheon city could 
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establish close international partnerships with those 30 Asian nations. 696 athletes over from 
30 Asian countries benefited from this Vision 2014 campaign which included 155 sport 
development programmes. As part of the Vision 2014, Incheon also assisted sport 
development in North Korea. Given the escalating political tension between the two Koreas, 
the South Korean port city’s attempt to help its northern neighbour signalling messages of 
peace—showing how sport can transcend ideological conflicts and political differences. More 
importantly, this initiative enabled 97 participants from developing Asian nations to take part 
in the 2014 Asian Games. This can be seen as a visible impact of this international sport 
development programme.  
This international development programme can be understood as the South Korean 
port city’s cultural relations strategy which potentially fosters Incheon’s and South Korea’s 
soft power in the relations between Asian states. Nye (2008) notes the nation-state whose 
foreign policy is concerned primarily with universal humanitarian values is more likely to 
shape a favourable international circumstance to the state so that it can fulfil its diplomatic 
aims more smoothly. In effect, a country’s effort to keep global social justice constitutes one 
of the key factors that increase a destinations attractiveness—which eventually contributes to 
enhancing its soft power. International sport development, particularly those activities 
designed to improve sporting skills and opportunities in the less developed world by 
providing material and technical supports is of paramount importance in this respect. Such 
efforts are certainly seen as a diplomatic, or related to sport diplomacy, to increase an 
influence of a specific country within the system of international sport governance. The 
Vision 2014 programme appears to be one such tactic to enhance Incheon’s merit. 
Without underestimating the valuable contribution that Incheon made by 
implementing this Vision 2014, it should also be pointed out whether this international 
assistance campaign is genuinely related to the principle of universal humanitarianism. A 
close examination of the context in which this international sport development programme 
took place reveals a slightly different picture. As noted earlier, the central government did not 
wholeheartedly advocate for Incheon’s intention to host the Asian Games. Given the 
competitive nature of the event bidding campaigns between New Delhi and Incheon, strong 
government support turned out to be crucial in order to win the Games. The lack of 
governmental endorsement was a severe disadvantage to Incheon. In an attempt to outweigh 
this shortcoming, the metropolitan government pledged the implementation of Vision 2014 
which would offer technical and material resources for sport development to developing 
Asian countries if the Asian Games was awarded to Incheon. It is difficult to claim that 
Incheon won the continental sporting event because of this pledged assistance programme. 
Nevertheless, given many member states of the Olympic Council of Asia would benefit from 
the Incheon’s promise, it is no exaggeration to argue that the potential beneficiaries voted for 
the South Korean port city. Therefore, Incheon’s international sport development programme 
seems to be merely a tactic to win the bid. Hence, it appears that the ethos of humanitarian 
development was simply a façade and that the self-interest of Incheon came first when the 
city offers the Vision 2014 programme. The fact that this sporting aid ceased soon after the 
mega-event finished also suggests this was merely a short-term and goal-oriented plan that 
focused only on winning the Asian Games bid.  
Vision 2014 initiative exasperated Incheon’s financial crisis after the Asian Games. 
As mentioned earlier, the city suffered from huge debts preparing for the sporting event. This 
was, in fact, one of the main reasons for the lack of political support from the central 
government. Yet, Incheon was persistent with its desire to host the Games at any costs 
without carefully considering the economic implications. The port city even pledged the 
delivery of this expensive aid project to outbid its competitors. Without entirely dismissing 
the ethos of Vision 2014, Incheon’s agreement to deliver the international sport development 
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project cost the port city almost $20 million, is an insensible offer considering its economic 
situation. 
 
The Asian Games and the ‘Korean Wave’  
The representation of contemporary South Korean popular culture was one of the 
main cultural events associated with the 2014 Asian Games. South Korea’s popular cultural 
industry (such as music, films and television shows) has attracted much attention in Asia 
recently (Chua & Iwabuchi, 2008), and in the past 10 years this industry has become one 
stimulators of the country’s economy (KOTRA, 2015). This growing popularity of Korean 
pop culture abroad is called the ‘Korean Wave.’ Currently, Korean cultural commodities are 
extensively circulated and consumed in a number of different Asian countries, and many 
South Korean film stars and pop musicians have become household names in those nations. 
Reflecting their popularity a large number of tourists from Asia, notably from China and 
Japan, regularly visit South Korea to pay homage to their pop idols. This Korean Wave 
focused tourism has significantly contributed to boosting the nation’s image and economy 
(Koh, 2012). In effect, the Korean Wave is a branding technique that symbolises the Korean 
pop culture industry today.  
The extensive circulation and consumption of South Korean cultural products in East 
Asian region is, to some extent, the outcome of the government’s effort to foster its culture 
industry as part of the nation’s soft power strategy (Kwon & Kim, 2014). As indicated earlier, 
having an attractive cultural heritage that includes contemporary mass culture constitutes an 
important component of cultural relations in global politics today (Nye, 2008). In this respect, 
the South Korean government invests in the development of culture because they considers 
this industry a dominant domain of creativity that helps further improve the nation’s 
reputation (Kwon & Kim, 2014). Moreover, it is especially expected that the dissemination of 
Korean cultural commodities to neighbouring Asian states can cultivate a social environment 
in those countries wherein positive attitudes towards Korea emerge—thus regenerating the 
nation’s image as an appealing popular destination. With these in mind, the South Korean 
government regards nurturing the popular culture industry a core policy agenda, and this 
political choice further enables the demanding market for the Korean Wave to expand 
continually both in the country and abroad. 
Given the increasing influence of the Korean Wave in Asia, it is no surprise that the 
South Korean pop culture accounts for one of the major themes at the Asian Games related 
cultural events. In fact, the exploitation of Korean cultural commodities during the 
continental sporting competition seems to be Incheon’s strategic choice to effectively attract 
the attention of people across the region to the Games, and subsequently to the host city. It 
was also expected that more Asian tourists would visit the port city not only for sport, but 
also to meet the Korean Wave stars during cultural programmes and at mini-concerts. In 
addition, famous South Korean film directors, Jang Jin and Im Kwon-taek, arranged the 
opening and closing ceremonies wherein the performances of Korean celebrities played a 
significant role. Also, a South Korean actress, Lee Young-Ae, was chosen to be the final 
torchbearer who lit the Asian Games cauldron. The finale of the opening ceremony was 
performed by a South Korean pop star PSY. After all, it seems that the Asian Games 
functioned as a theatre to display the country’s sought-after cultural icons.  
The use of Korean popular culture itself is not necessarily problematic. However, it 
appears that the opening and closing ceremonies relied too much on the cultural commodities 
in making the shows more spectacular. So much so that, the representation of sporting 
tradition and historical legacies of the host city were comparatively neglected. Given that the 
Korean entertainment industry displayed throughout the events ceremonies has no 
meaningfully historical and cultural connection with Korean sports and local tradition, the 
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abundance of the Korean pop culture failed to explain the values of the sporting competition, 
namely ‘Diversity Shine Here,’ and the narrative of Incheon’s long history sufficiently. For 
instance, while many South Korean celebrities were invited to the ceremonies, many of key 
sport personalities, particularly a former Manchester United midfielder Ji-sung Park and an 
Olympic champion Yuna Kim, arguably the most famous international sport stars who the 
country has ever produced, were not asked to attend the events. The selection of the final 
Asian Games torchbearer triggered some controversy. Conventionally, an individual who lit 
the cauldron was chosen from athletes whose characters and achievements suitably 
symbolises the values of the sporting competition. At the Incheon Asian Games, as 
mentioned earlier, a popular film star undertook this role simply because the actress was a 
well-known figure. This indicates that the central message disseminated through the 
ceremonies concerns the promotion of South Korean cultural commodities. The fundamental 
value of the Asian Games was overshadowed by a superficial entertainment. Reflecting this, 
one commentator aptly points out that the opening ceremony of this continental sporting 
event turned out to be an occasion to simply promote products associated with the Korean 
Wave (Han, 2014). 
Additionally, the ceremonies paid only scarce attention to the social and cultural 
history of Incheon. The opening and closing ceremonies conventionally include a section 
which is devoted to displaying the legacy and heritage of local traditions. Incheon was the 
first international seaport in the country and as the main gateway port, Incheon observed the 
influx of the large volume of modern cultural products and foreign goods from Europe to the 
country for the first time in its history. This implies that Incheon played an important role in 
the modernisation of Korea. The direct inter-cultural encounter that Incheon experienced in 
the late nineteenth century also built the circumstance that the port city easily embraces 
multiculturalism later. These historical narratives potentially offer useful concepts that fit the 
main theme of the Asian Games, yet these elements were not sufficiently utilised in the 
opening and closing ceremonies. 
Overall, the Incheon Asian Games, particularly the opening and closing ceremonies, 
simply offered an extravaganza of South Korean pop culture. This may have entertained the 
athletes, guests, and tourists from neighbouring Asian countries, yet the essence of the Asian 
Games, which includes the ethos of the continental sporting festival which celebrates cultural 
diversity through sports and the heritage of the South Korean port city, was largely omitted 
from the ceremonies and other cultural events associated with this sporting competition. 
Given Incheon attempted to establish its new urban identity as a hub of Northeast Asian 
economy and transportation, the lack of demonstration acknowledging the city’s local history 
as a traditional port city that embraced multiculturalism was arguably a major shortcoming of 
the event. The spectacle of Korean pop culture alone simply does not fulfil Incheon’s desire 
to construct its new identity.  
 
Conclusion  
Incheon’s metropolitan government has been undertaking a massive urban 
regeneration project in order to develop the port city into a node of Northeast Asian 
transportation and economic networks. The delivery of the Summer Asian Games, which is 
the largest continental sporting competition, must be understood as part of this redevelopment 
plan. The metropolitan government anticipated that the Asian Games would have positive 
implications for this new urban policy—and therefore attempted to use this sporting occasion 
as a vehicle to facilitate a redevelopment process aimed at rebranding Incheon as a centre of 
Northeast Asian industry. Boosting the local economy was also an important consideration.  
This optimism disappeared once the event finished. As long as cultural, economic and 
political implications are concerned, the Incheon Asian Games is arguably the least 
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successful event South Korea has ever hosted. The preparation for and delivery of the two 
weeks of sporting competition left a huge economic deficit, and the newly built Asian Games 
stadium is hardly used in the post-event period. Rather than stimulating the local economy, 
Incheon has become the most indebted city in the country after the event (Kim, 2014). Of 
course, the citizens of Incheon are mainly responsible for the repayment of this debt that 
hosting the Asian Games caused (Green Korea, 2015). Moreover, Incheon’s international 
sport development programme created an additional financial burden. Surely this campaign 
had merit in terms of helping less well-off neighbouring nations. Nevertheless, Vision 2014 
was certainly an irresponsible project, especially in consideration of the worsening economic 
situation that Incheon faced. Furthermore, cultural contents displayed through the opening 
and closing ceremonies were rather frustrating. These occasions mainly showed a series of 
Korean pop culture performances they did not sufficiently represent Incheon’s historical 
legacy alongside its new urban identity that the city attempted to establish. Hence, in contrast 
to the optimism before the event, the 17
th
 Asian Games appeared in some ways to influence 
the development of Incheon negatively.  
Ironically, the Incheon Asian Games was also an important incident because of the 
negative impact. After witnessing the Incheon metropolitan government’s financial 
mismanagement approach along with the inadequate orchestration of the Asian Games 
ceremonies, a number of civic organisations, academics and the media keep requesting that 
an independent and transparent post-event investigation into the preparation and delivery of 
the Asian Games be conducted (Choi, 2014). Incheon’s fiasco also triggers mega-event 
scepticism within South Korea’s civic society. It may be an exaggeration to state that this 
critical view on hosting a mega sporting event is extensively accepted by the establishment. 
However, it is also difficult to deny that a number of people who join this anti-mega sporting 
event campaign is continually increasing, especially after the Incheon Asian Games. 
Incheon’s huge financial deficits and the city’s now almost neglected sporting facilities 
influence Korean people and policy makers alike are challenged to objectively re-evaluate the 
hosting of a mega-event in their municipalities. This may be indicative of the belief of 
economic development and urban regeneration through hosting a mega sporting event being 
dismantled. If this is the case, emerging sporting mega-event scepticism and debunking 
myths of sporting mega-event driven development are unintended but unignorable legacies of 
the Incheon Asian Games—which render this sporting occasion rather significant. 
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